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Abstract
The study explores the challenges UK-based institutional investors face when trying to monitor
investee companies and inﬂuence their social, environmental, and governance practices. Consist-
ent with previous research, I ﬁnd that misalignment of interests within the investment chain and
dispersed ownership are factors which inhibit investor activism. However, other underexplored
challenges include lack of investee company transparency and investor experience in activism, as
well as low client demand for engagement and internal conﬂicts of interest. The results contribute
to the literature on institutional investor activism by using direct empirical evidence to systemati-
cally discuss the challenges to stewardship. Given the intensiﬁcation of media and regulatory
attention on shareholders in the post-global ﬁnancial crisis era, coupled with investors’ growing
awareness and practice of stewardship, the research opens new avenues for enquiry which go
beyond the on-going debate about the monitoring versus short-termism roles of institutional
investors.
1 | INTRODUCTION
The global ﬁnancial crisis of 2008 has given a new impetus toward
rethinking the fundamental principles of corporate governance. It is
now widely accepted that one of the causes of the downturn can be
attributed to institutional investors’ failure to monitor their investee
companies. The Walker Review, commissioned by the UK government
to investigate corporate governance standards of UK ﬁnancial institu-
tions following the banking crisis, concluded that risky business models
went unchallenged by major investors in the pursuit of short-term
gains to the detriment of the economy (Walker, 2009).
In a recent study, Manconi, Massa, and Yasuda (2012) ﬁnd evi-
dence that the portfolio decisions made by liquidity-constrained invest-
ors contributed to the spread of the crisis from the securitized to the
corporate bond market. The economic recession, alongside recent con-
troversies around tax avoidance and fossil fuels, have highlighted the
need for more active monitoring by institutional investors (comprised
of banks, pension funds, insurance companies, and other bodies that
trade in large share quantities and invest money on behalf of share-
holders). A number of UK government reviews (for example, Kay,
2012; Myners, 2001) put an emphasis on the responsibility of investors
to act as “stewards” of the companies they hold shares in, which entails
“holding the board to account for the fulﬁlment of its responsibilities”
(Financial Reporting Council, 2012, p. 1).
The literature on institutional investors is dominated by a debate
concerning their role and behavior. Two opposing views exist, which
are labeled by Callen and Fang (2013) as “monitoring” and “short-
termism.” The monitoring perspective suggests that institutional invest-
ors are focused on maximizing long-term value, as opposed to generat-
ing short-term proﬁts, and they engage with management in order to
achieve this objective (Dobrzynski 1993; Monks & Minow 1995; Shlei-
fer & Vishny 1986, 1997). Previous research provides evidence of the
positive eﬀects that institutional ownership has on: CEO turnover (Hel-
wege, Intintoli, & Zhang, 2012), research and development spending
(David, Hitt, & Gimeno, 2001), ﬁrm performance (Elyasiani & Jia, 2008),
corporate governance (Aggarwal, Erel, Ferreira, & Matos, 2011), execu-
tive compensation (Janakiraman, Radhakrishnan, & Tsang, 2010; Zheng,
2010), and market wide negative shocks (Cella, Ellul, & Giannetti,
2013). Empirical evidence consistent with the monitoring view also
reveals that institutional shareholder activism results in improved ﬁrm
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operating performance and proﬁtability (Dimson, Karakas, & Li, 2015),
increased shareholder value (Becht, Franks, Mayer, & Rossi, 2010) and
positive market reaction for the target ﬁrm (Cunat, Gine, & Guadalupe,
2012; Klein & Zur, 2009).
However, there are researchers who argue that investors do not
engage with investee companies enough (Black, 1990), preferring to, in
cases when monitoring is costly or time consuming, respond to a poor
performance by just selling their shares (Coﬀee, 1991; Manconi et al.,
2012). Ivanova (2016) explores some of the reasons why this trend is
more pronounced in the UK than in the United States. Davis (2008)
and Jackson (2008) observe an ownership paradox related to share-
holders, whereby large institutions have traditionally adopted a passive
approach and have refrained from challenging management’s decisions.
The short-termism perspective sees institutional investors as transient
owners (Bushee, 2001), who have high turnover portfolios, are focused
on short-term performance, and fail to act as responsible stewards of
the corporation (Graves & Waddock, 1990; Yan & Zhang, 2009).
Over the last two and a half decades institutional investors, with
their global diversiﬁed portfolios, have emerged as an inﬂuential actor
in the capital markets (Wen, 2009) and have come to be regarded by
some as a crucial driver of improved CSR performance across compa-
nies: “it is institutional investors (. . .) that are most likely to provide
leverage on companies to improve their performance with respect to
CSR” (Sparkes & Cowton, 2004, p. 54). As mentioned above, the impor-
tance of institutional investor stewardship for good corporate gover-
nance has been emphasized by the UK government, and the positive
eﬀect of monitoring has been well documented in the empirical litera-
ture. In addition, the public and the media have exhibited an increasing
awareness of business ethics (Wen, 2009). Research conducted by
Aguilera, Williams, Conley, and Rupp (2006) reveals that, compared
with the United States, topics such as corporations and investors’ social
responsibility are more frequently discussed in the UK media.
The purpose of this study is to contribute to the monitoring versus
short-term debate in the literature by going beyond what has tradition-
ally been the focus of research enquiry. Previous studies have so far
attempted to predict the eﬀects of investor characteristics on the will-
ingness to intervene and have tested the relationship between moni-
toring and diﬀerent variables such as ﬁrm value, R&D, and executive
compensation. However, another crucial question has been strangely
neglected, given the rising emphasis governments, the media and the
public have placed on prudent institutional ownership behavior. This
overlooked question is “What are the challenges faced by active invest-
ors who are concerned about environmental, social, and governance
(ESG) issues and who monitor corporate management to improve ﬁrm
performance?” Understanding such challenges would be of relevance
to researchers studying the behavior of institutional investors, as well
as actors who endeavor to incite greater investor activism. Leaving the
issue of passivity among shareholders aside, the main focus here is not
on explaining the reasons for this passivity, but on understanding the
challenges faced by engaged investors who endeavor to exercise con-
trol over investee companies. As such, factors such as short-term
investment horizons, preference for exit over voice, and lack of univer-
sal belief in the link between monitoring and ﬁrm performance will not
form part of the discussion. Here, the terms monitoring, shareholder/
investor activism, and active ownership are used interchangeably to
denote the same activities related to “the use of ownership rights
attached to ordinary shares to inﬂuence company management”
(Sparkes, 2008). These activities encompass not only shareholder vot-
ing at annual general meetings (AGMs) and ﬁling of shareholder resolu-
tions (Sparkes, 2001), but also informal dialogue (or engagement) with
corporate executives (Sparkes & Cowton, 2004), asking questions at an
AGM, letter writing and publicity campaigns. In reality, monitoring and
shareholder activism do not rely on a single strategy, but often involve
a combination of key activities (see Ivanova, 2016). Therefore, the deﬁ-
nition used in the study comprises investor actions that involve both
private dialogue and public confrontation.
The ﬁndings are based on a detailed empirical investigation encom-
passing semi-structured interviews with institutional investors, socially
responsible investment (SRI1) experts, and NGOs which engage with
investors with the aim of inciting active monitoring behavior. Direct
knowledge on the interactions between companies and investors, and
the challenges faced by the latter, is scarce as engagement often takes
place behind closed doors (Becht et al., 2010; Owen, Kirchmaier, &
Grant, 2006). Even when present, discussions about the barriers faced
by active owners are of a supplementary nature to the main research
enquiry, the ﬁndings are speculative (Wen, 2009), based on quantita-
tive survey data (McCahery, Sautner, & Starks, 2016), or focusing on
only one activist institution (Becht et al., 2010; Carleton, Nelson, &
Weisbach, 1998; Smith, 1996). The current paper helps to ﬁll this
knowledge gap by conducting a qualitative study centred on a question
which it is hoped will open new research pathways within the monitor-
ing versus short-termism debate. By not focusing on a particular case
study, and instead eliciting the views of a wide range of investors, SRI
professionals and other stakeholders (i.e., NGOs), the paper provides a
more generalizable perspective of the challenges faced by active
owners.
The study researches UK-based institutional investors since the
UK has the strongest tradition of active ownership in all European
countries and is recognized as a leader (Louche & Lydenberg, 2006),
with the highest number of shareholder activist campaigns outside
North America (Khorana, Hoover, Shivdasani, Sigurdsson, & Zhang,
2013). Shareholder activism is very context-speciﬁc, with factors such
as the corporate governance system and regulatory environment of a
given country having an impact on engagement dynamics. Therefore,
limiting the geographical scope to institutions with headquarters in the
UK enables a more in-depth exploration of the challenges to engage-
ment in this particular context, by limiting complexity. The current
paper also addresses an imbalance in the literature related to the higher
quantity of studies exploring the phenomenon from a U.S. perspective.
The generalization of ﬁndings beyond the UK is impeded by the
context-speciﬁc nature of the phenomenon under study, but
the results discussed here could be of use to other scholars in the
future, who wish to make a comparison with empirical ﬁndings they
have obtained in a diﬀerent geographical context.
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This paper makes several contributions to the ﬁeld of SRI from a
theoretical, empirical, and practical standpoint. First, the research pro-
vides direct empirical and qualitative evidence of institutional investors’
perceptions of the impediments to stewardship. Second, in a recent
special issue of Business Ethics: A European Review, Campbell and
Cowton (2015, p. 5) ask: “Why is it of interest, for example, if two par-
ticular variables are correlated?” and “If ethics does not pay, so what?”
In response to this, the study goes beyond what has traditionally been
the focus of research enquiry—the correlation between diﬀerent varia-
bles—and contributes to the monitoring versus short-term debate in
the literature by expanding the remit of research questions. Third, I
contribute to the work of Juravle and Lewis (2008) who created a
framework identifying impediments to responsible investment (RI) on
three levels: institutional, organizational, and individual, by providing
empirical evidence for the existence of some of these challenges and
by expanding the framework through discussing impediments not pre-
viously observed in the literature. Fourth, the study oﬀers a broader
perspective on challenges to action across diﬀerent types of investors,
thus expanding Sievanen’s (2014) work which has a speciﬁc focus on
pension funds. Moreover, the study has practical implications as it pro-
vides information which could aid policy makers in designing incentives
for RI. The insights generated here could also be of value to various
stakeholders engaging with investors such as unions and NGOs.
The empirical results reveal that the ﬁve main barriers that inhibit
institutional investor monitoring of the corporation are: misalignment
of interests within the investment chain; poor company transparency
on ESG issues and lack of investor experience in shareholder activism;
internal conﬂicts of interest; diversiﬁed portfolios and resource scar-
city; and client inertia. The paper is organized as follows. Section 2
explores the rise and growing signiﬁcance of institutional investor own-
ership and activism. Section 3 reviews prior literature on the propensity
of institutional investors to act as monitors and the eﬀects of monitor-
ing behavior. Section 4 describes the research methods, sample and
data analysis technique. Section 5 presents the main empirical ﬁndings.
Section 6 outlines the implications of the research and concludes.
2 | INSTITUTIONAL OWNERSHIP AND
ACTIVISM—RISE AND SIGNIFICANCE
Until the early 1960s, individuals dominated the activist landscape in
the UK as they held close to 55% of all the shares (Oﬃce for National
Statistics, 2012, see Figure 1). This trend has changed drastically as
individuals now hold 10.7% of UK equities. Figure 1 shows that, from
the 1960s onward, institutional investors substantially increased their
equity exposure. Historically, the ownership structure of the U.S. stock
market has developed following similar trends (see Gillan & Starks,
2007). More recently, as a result of globalization, UK equities held
by foreign institutions have increased sharply post-1994 and they are
currently at the top of the list, holding 53.2% of the equity market as
of 2012.
At a more granular level, Table 1 explores the historical stock mar-
ket ownership patterns of some of the biggest institutional investors
such as pension funds and insurance companies.
By the 1990s pension funds and insurance companies were the
most prominent holders of equity, accounting for more than half of the
total (see Table 1). Although their ownership stake in the market has
decreased, they still hold a signiﬁcant proportion of shares (11% of the
value of the UK stock market, Table 1). Furthermore, since the late
1990s, hedge funds (which form part of “other ﬁnancial institutions”)
have become prominent actors in the shareholder activist arena
(Greenwood & Schor, 2009). However, they focus on corporate gover-
nance rather than on ethical issues and pursue activism as a proﬁt-
making strategy (Kahan & Rock, 2007), engaging with company
directors with the objective of unlocking shareholder value. Overall,
over the last 30 years, there has been a noticeable concentration of
corporate ownership in the hands of institutional shareholders
(Goergen, 2007) who, as Clark and Knight (2006) reveal, hold 70% of
all listed equities in the UK.
A number of high-proﬁle corporate scandals in the Anglo-Saxon
world toward the end of the 20th century, such as Enron and World-
Com in the United States and BCCI in the UK and, more recently, the
FIGURE 1 Historical trends in beneﬁcial ownership in the UK (percentage of UK stock market owned by value)
Source. Compiled by the author based on data from the Oﬃce for National Statistics (ONS, 2012).
Note. Here, “beneﬁcial owner” is deﬁned as the person or body who receives the beneﬁts of holding the shares, for example income
through dividends.
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global ﬁnancial crisis, have led to a greater recognition of shareholders’
responsibilities as owners. As a result, active ownership has seen a rise
—in a recent study, Kolstad (2016) reports a change in institutional
investors’ approach toward engagement as a preferred SRI strategy.
Similarly, citing data from Eurosif (2012), Sievanen (2014) indicates
that, not only has responsible investment grown substantially, but
more than 90% of the RI market comprises investments by institutional
investors. A report published by Citi’s Financial and Strategy Group in
2013 describes shareholder activism as “a sweeping trend that has
spread to companies in all sectors and of all sizes, and increasingly,
across all geographic regions” (Khorana et al., 2013, p. 1). The latest
“Annual Review of Trends in Shareholder Activism” indicates that a
total of 551 companies worldwide were subjected to activist demands
in 2015, up 16% from the 344 recorded in 2014 (291 in 2013) (Activist
Insight, 2016). In the UK context, 58 companies faced a public demand
from activists, up from 44 in 2014 and 54 in 2013. Engagement and
voting as a strategy has also experienced signiﬁcant growth across
Europe, with a 36% increase per annum from 2011 to 2013, reaching
3.3 trillion Euro in 2013 (Eurosif, 2014). Taking into account these ﬁg-
ures, it could be argued that large institutional investors can and have
started to play a role in encouraging responsible corporate behavior.
The next section explores the literature with a view to reviewing the
antecedents of activism and its eﬀects on corporations.
3 | THE ANTECEDENTS AND EFFECTS OF
MONITORING—EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE
The literature on institutional investor activism can broadly be divided
into two strands which are brieﬂy discussed here—namely, the eﬀects
of diﬀerent investor characteristics on the propensity to monitor cor-
porate behavior and the impact of investor stewardship on diﬀerent
variables such as ﬁrm performance, shareholder value, CEO turnover,
among others.
The empirical literature which explores the antecedents of investor
voice discusses factors such as the investment horizon, the size of insti-
tutional investors and the liquidity of a portfolio’s ﬁrm stock, in an
eﬀort to explain why certain institutions act as monitors and others do
not. However, the resulting ﬁndings are often ambiguous and contra-
dictory. For example, the investment horizon of institutional investors
is one characteristic considered to have an impact on active ownership.
On the one hand, it is believed that long-term, or dedicated (see
Bushee, 1998), shareholders have an incentive to monitor the corpora-
tion as they are more interested in long-term proﬁtability and likely to
still hold the shares when the corresponding beneﬁts arise (Chen,
Harford, & Li, 2007; Neubaum & Zahra, 2006). On the other hand,
short-term, or transient, investors such as hedge funds may have
greater incentives to intervene and may do so more often in pursuit of
short-term proﬁts at the expense of long-term ﬁrm value (Bratton &
Wachter, 2010).
The size of an institutional investor can also determine its propen-
sity to be an active owner. Generally, investors with bigger stakes in
their investee companies have higher monitoring incentives as their
inﬂuence and resulting beneﬁts from activism increase (Shleifer &
Vishny, 1986). Furthermore, some believe that the liquidity of portfolio
holdings attenuates the intensity of institutional investor monitoring
(Almazan, Hartzell, & Starks, 2005), because it encourages shareholders
to divest rather than intervene (Back, Li, & Ljungqvist, 2015). At the
same time, Faure-Grimaud and Gromb (2004) ﬁnd that higher liquidity
can incentivize monitoring behavior as investors are able to reap the
beneﬁts of their engagement with companies, if they have to sell their
shares prematurely.
Diﬀerences in regulations and corporate governance regimes may
also explain variations in the degree of investor monitoring. The Anglo-
American model of corporate governance (the UK being an example of
a country that adopts it), is often contrasted to the Continental Euro-
pean corporate governance model (Becht & Roell, 1999; La Porta,
Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1998). Wen (2009) cites two char-
acteristics of the Anglo-American corporate governance model which
minimize the incentives for investors to monitor corporate perform-
ance—the ﬁxation on shareholder value and the highly diﬀused owner-
ship structure of corporations.
Apart from the antecedents outlined above, researchers have dedi-
cated attention to analyzing the impact of monitoring on various aspects
of the corporation. Callen and Fang (2013) provide empirical evidence
that more stable institutional investors act as monitors and reduce future
stock price crash risk, because they prevent management from hoarding
bad news. In a similar vein, Cella et al. (2013) argue that investors with
short-term horizons amplify the eﬀects of market-wide negative shocks
by demanding liquidity. Dimson et al. (2015) examine the highly inten-
sive ESG corporate engagement activities at U.S. public companies
between 1999 and 2009. The ﬁndings reveal that successful engage-
ments generate cumulative abnormal returns of 17.1%. The research
provides evidence that monitoring leads to improved accounting per-
formance and governance of the targeted ﬁrms. The eﬀects of monitor-
ing on corporate governance are also explored by Aggarwal et al. (2011)
who analyze the portfolio holdings of institutional investors across 23
countries over the period 2003–2008. They conclude that the greater
presence of institutional ownership translates into higher likelihood of
dismissing poorly performing CEOs, leading to improvements in valua-
tion over time. Monitoring is also found to positively impact R&D spend-
ing as suggested by David et al. (2001) who conclude that institutional
activism increases R&D inputs over the short term and the long term.
TABLE 1 Historical trends in ownership (UK): insurance companies,
pension funds, and ﬁnancial institutions (percentage of stock market
owned by value)
1963 1975 1981 1991 2001 2008 2010 2012
Insurance
companies
10.0 15.9 20.5 20.8 20.0 13.4 8.8 6.2
Pension funds 6.4 16.8 26.7 31.3 16.1 12.8 5.6 4.7
Other ﬁnancial
institutions
11.3 10.5 6.8 0.8 7.2 10.0 12.3 6.6
Source. ONS (2012).
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Overall, the evidence above suggests that the antecedents of
active institutional ownership are complex and multifaceted. A variety
of diﬀerent factors need to be taken into account when explaining
monitoring behavior and the results are not easily generalizable across
contexts. At the same time, the literature is proliﬁc in its description of
the beneﬁts arising from institutional activism. Taking these two con-
clusions into account, it would be beneﬁcial to move away from the
monitoring versus short-termism debate and ask a more pertinent
question concerning the challenges to active ownership faced by UK
institutions.
4 | QUALITATIVE RESEARCH
METHODOLOGY
Direct knowledge of the interactions between institutional investors
and portfolio ﬁrms is limited, especially in the UK context, where
engagements (private dialogue) occur behind-the-scenes (Becht et al.,
2010; McCahery et al., 2016). Therefore, the preferences and obstacles
faced by investors are diﬃcult to observe. Since the challenges to insti-
tutional investor stewardship are relatively unexplored (Sievanen,
2014), in-depth qualitative interviews served as an appropriate
research methodology (Strauss & Corbin, 1990). In addition, given that
the research is exploratory in nature and seeks to identify a variety of
factors that have an impact on active ownership, the qualitative
method surpasses the problems of categorical imposition typical of sur-
vey research and represents respondents’ views more accurately
(Alvesson & Deetz, 2000). Due to the nature of the enquiry, which
required gaining insight into conditions of great complexity, the
researcher needed to be able to adapt the interview questions and fol-
low up issues as they arise. The ﬂexibility aﬀorded by the semi-struc-
tured interview facilitated this process (Bryman, 2008; Lewis and
Nicholls, 2014). Similar qualitative methods have also been used by
researchers examining the impact of shareholder activism (Hoﬀman,
1996; O’Rourke, 2003) and the shareholder activist strategies of NGOs
(Sjostrom, 2007). In a multidisciplinary review of the literature on moni-
toring and activism, Sjostrom (2008) highlights the need for more
empirical qualitative studies. Moreover, in a recent special issue on
research methods in Business Ethics: A European Review, Campbell and
Cowton (2015) emphasize the need for more qualitative research in
the ﬁeld, calling into question the often implicit assumption that a
study has to be quantitative to be robust and legitimate.
4.1 | Data collection
Altogether, 25 face-to-face interviews were conducted with UK-based
institutional investors (both SRI and mainstream), NGOs working with
investors as part of their shareholder activist campaigns, service pro-
viders, and experts in the ﬁeld of responsible investment. Table 2 pro-
vides a list of the organizations and individuals participating in the
research. All interviews lasted between 40 and 90 min. They were digi-
tally recorded and transcribed verbatim. Interviewees were reminded
that their conﬁdentiality will be safeguarded and that the researcher
sought their honest opinions (Oberseder, Schlegelmilch, & Gruber,
2011).
A design of an interview schedule preceded the beginning of the
data collection process. Emerging questions, which elicit further elabo-
ration and facilitate the exploration of leads, were also asked (Gubrium
& Holstein, 2002). All interviews were conducted in the participants’
natural work environment with a view of contextualizing the research
ﬁndings and enhancing ecological validity (Creswell, 2003). The sample
size reﬂects the author’s desire to do justice to the richness of the
qualitative data collected in the analysis by avoiding the pitfall of
unnecessarily including a large sample. Instead, the focus was on qual-
ity, with the primary concern being to secure a sample which is highly
rich in terms of constituents and the diversity it represents.
The initial set of questions in the interview guide allowed for a
general discussion of the challenges to institutional investor monitoring
of the corporation. Next, interviewees were asked to identify examples
from their own practice based on speciﬁc interventions they have been
involved in (i.e., obstacles faced by activist investors when monitoring
portfolio companies; challenges to stewardship as reported by NGOs
which work in collaboration with investors on ESG campaigns, and
observations from service providers and independent consultants
based on their investor clients’ experience). In addition, questions were
asked regarding the role of legislation for remedying the challenges and
other steps that could facilitate eﬀective monitoring.
4.2 | Interview sample
As the research has a UK focus, the participants were recruited from
the UK. Most were based in London, reﬂecting the importance of the
City as a major international ﬁnancial center. Initial sampling was con-
ducted by establishing a link with the leading charity in the UK working
in the area of shareholder activism, which has extensive contacts in the
investment and NGO communities (ShareAction). The ﬁrst interviews
were conducted based on referrals by ShareAction, and subsequent
data collection was managed through a mixture of snowball and pur-
posive sampling. The participants worked across a wide range of indus-
tries, including ﬁnancial services and insurance, not-for-proﬁt,
consultancy, and academic to provide a more comprehensive perspec-
tive on the challenges to active institutional ownership. This sampling
approach provides an opportunity to consider the behaviors and
knowledge of diﬀerent key stakeholders, which in turn makes the
research robust and rich, shedding light on divergent aspects of the
research question and avoiding bias (Ritchie, Lewis, Elam, Tennant, &
Rahim, 2014). The institutional investors that took part in the study
comprised both large mainstream investors and smaller SRI-oriented
investors. There were a total of eight interviews with investors and
investor coalitions (three with asset owners, four with asset managers,
and one mixed), nine interviews with NGOs, three interviews with
independent responsible investment consultants, four interviews with
consultancy and research organizations specializing in providing serv-
ices to investors, and one interview with an academic expert in SRI
(see Table 2 which lists all interviewees in anonymized form). One pos-
sible limitation of snowballing sampling lies in the possibility to be left
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TABLE 2 Interview participants
Organization Position of interviewee
1 A large SRI asset owner with set ethical investment policy and a
track record of monitoring investee companies.
Ethical and responsible investment professional.
2 One of Europe’s largest asset management companies based in the
UK and invested across all major asset classes.
A specialist in active ownership and stewardship.
3 An asset management company managing investments for charities,
the public sector, and religious organizations.
A member of staﬀ responsible for the ethical and responsible
investment strategy and engagement activities of the fund.
4 A church-based investor coalition of asset owners with a focus on
issues of business, human rights, and environmental stewardship.
A senior staﬀ member, overseeing the strategy of the organization.
5 An independent grant-making organization funding a change
toward a better world in the UK and Ireland. As an asset owner, it
holds a portfolio of investments in UK and overseas equities.
A member of staﬀ responsible for the trust’s investment strategy.
6 An investment management company with a long-term focus on
listed consumer sector businesses in emerging markets.
ESG analyst.
7 A global asset management ﬁrm, whose assets under management
amount to almost £274 billion across a range of funds, with £21
billion of assets in UK equities.
A senior staﬀ member leading the monitoring activities of the ﬁrm.
8 Voluntary global network of pension funds, asset managers and
insurers working to advance responsible investment.
A member of staﬀ who works closely with investors and oversees
their projects.
9 Independent responsible investment advisor.
10 Responsible investment consultant to a number of charities with
extensive experience in working with investors.
11 Writer, editor, researcher, and consultant with previous experience
in shareholder activism.
12, 13 A leading global provider of social, environmental, and governance
research. Providing independent analysis to responsible investors.
Two interviews—one with a senior staﬀ member working in the area
of responsible investment and another with a senior investment
analyst with expertize in social, environmental, and governance
research of companies.
14 Leading specialist organization working for investors to provide
engagement and investment management solutions on ESG issues.
A member of staﬀ working in the engagement team.
15 A global leader in sustainability research and analysis, providing
insights to investors and ﬁnancial institutions.
A member of staﬀ working with UK investors to support their
responsible investment strategies.
16 The leading UK charity which specializes in shareholder activism. Senior staﬀ member responsible for the overall strategy of the
organization and closely involved in the campaign’s work.
17 UK-based independent nonproﬁt organization which works with
business, government, investors and other organizations to solve
sustainability challenges.
Staﬀ member working in the area of sustainable ﬁnancial markets.
18 UK organization which works with investors and corporations on
greenhouse gas emissions.
A senior staﬀ member looking after the organization’s investor
relations.
19 A big international NGO with a focus on environmental issues and
peace.
Staﬀ member working in the area of capital markets and involved in
shareholder activist campaigns.
20 A big international NGO campaigning on climate change, food, and
biodiversity.
Staﬀ member involved in shareholder activist campaigns.
21 An international NGO campaigning on human rights issues. Staﬀ member of the organization responsible for engagement with
investors.
22 A UK charity focused on the social, environmental, and economic
impacts of the global oil industry.
Writer and researcher involved in shareholder campaigns.
23 An international NGO working in the ﬁeld of environmental and
biodiversity conservation.
Staﬀ member working in the area of sustainable ﬁnance.
24 UK think tank promoting social, environmental, and economic
justice.
A member of staﬀ working on a number of research and advocacy
projects on reforming capital markets.
25 A top UK academic institution. An academic focusing on responsible investment and corporate
governance.
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with a one-sided view of a topic if individuals recommend like-minded
people as potential interviewees. To mitigate this problem, the snow-
balling sampling method was supplemented with a purposive technique
which ensured that the researcher maintained a certain level of control
over the sample in two ways—by directing key insiders as to the identi-
ties of individuals to whom they refer and by making a decision in
terms of which of the potential informants would be interviewed (Ber-
nard, 2002; Noy, 2008). A consideration was given to participants’
experience (time spent in the organization) and knowledge of the
responsible investment industry, alongside their involvement in diﬀer-
ent shareholder activist campaigns. The researcher investigated each
organization’s webpage and relevant documents to conﬁrm the suit-
ability of the interviewee, with a focus on those considered to be the
most information rich participants, capable of providing a balanced and
objective perspective. The snowballing strategy facilitated the gaining
of access to senior level participants who have limited time and was
also of beneﬁt for gaining their trust.
4.3 | Data analysis
To analyze the data, the interviews were ﬁrst transcribed and trans-
formed into a coherent narrative (Silverman, 1993). The data were
then thematically analyzed. This entailed condensing the data set (Cof-
fey & Atkinson, 1996) by assigning codes to text of varying size such
as words, sentences, and paragraphs (Miles & Huberman, 1994). Inter-
viewees were allowed to comment on the interview transcripts result-
ing in clariﬁcation of the interpretation. A data-led approach to coding
resulted in initial codes being generated for aspects of the data which
seemed important. After a careful reading and re-reading of the inter-
views, initial codes were joined together in a meaningful way to form
themes, based on repetitions and similarities across participants. Each
theme represented a diﬀerent challenge to active ownership and the
number of times each of these was mentioned by diﬀerent respond-
ents was recorded. The themes were then ranked in descending order
according to their prevalence in interview extracts. Table 3 provides a
summary of the results and the ranking. The themes are ranked by
“most often mentioned” in interviewee extracts—it would be inaccurate
to draw conclusions about the importance of each factor on the basis
of this ranking as this will likely vary among diﬀerent stakeholders and
depend on their characteristics, motivations, and perspectives. Rather,
the results provide “a middle ground,” an insight into the challenges
that are relevant to a wider group of stakeholders with diverse inter-
ests. The next section discusses in greater detail the ﬁndings and com-
pares the results with insights from the existing literature.
5 | CHALLENGES TO THE EFFECTIVE
MONITORING OF THE CORPORATION:
EMPIRICAL FINDINGS
Despite the fact that shareholder activism has passed through a process
of maturation expressed in its adoption by an increasing number of large
institutional investors (Sparkes & Cowton, 2004), a number of obstacles
still exist and restrict investors’ ability to eﬀectively monitor investee
companies. Understanding these impediments is of importance for pol-
icy makers trying to incentivize active ownership behavior, for NGOs
wanting to inﬂuence the investment community, and for researchers
seeking to explain investor behavior. Table 3 reveals the ﬁndings by list-
ing the most widely cited challenges to active ownership identiﬁed by
interviewees. The table ranks them according to the number of inter-
viewees that have recognized each of the factors as a barrier.
5.1 | Misalignment of interests
To begin with, the results provide empirical evidence for McCahery
et al.’s (2016) claim that the structure of the investment management
industry impedes intervention as this was identiﬁed as a challenge by
the greatest number of interviewees (11 out of 25). The decline of indi-
vidual shareholdings and the reduction of investments in equities by
pension funds and insurers have resulted in asset managers (or fund
managers) becoming the dominant players in the investment chain
(Kay, 2012). Asset managers are those who most often exercise the
rights of active ownership associated with voting, or the buying and
selling of shares. Despite this, their appointment, monitoring, and
remuneration are based on short-term performance to the detriment
of long-term value creation, as explained by one responsible invest-
ment consultant:
The main problem is fund managers are paid on short-term per-
formance. You cannot expect someone who is incentivized on
a short-term basis to think about the medium or long-term
(Fieldwork Interview, RI consultant, 2013).
The situation creates a misalignment of interests between shareowners
(the beneﬁciaries), some of which are long-term investors, and the
actions of fund managers:
TABLE 3 Main ﬁndings
Rank Impediment to active ownership
Number of interviewees who have
identiﬁed it as a challenge
1 Misalignment of interests within the investment chain 11
25 Lack of suﬃcient company transparency and investor experience in activism 10
25 Internal conﬂicts of interest 10
3 Diversiﬁed portfolios and resource scarcity 8
4 Client inertia 7
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The system is not working well. . . in the short term asset own-
ers put the money with the fund manager, whose yearly bonus
depends on really short-term performance against an index of
stocks, and sustainability factors are not top priority. So, there’s
a mismatch between the incentives of the fund manager and
the need for the client, the pension fund, for a much more
long-term, sustainability oriented approach (Fieldwork Interview,
NGO leading expert in RI, 2013).
Models of managerial myopia which suggest that executives of ﬁrms
with high levels of transient investor ownership exhibit increased
myopic behavior (Bushee, 1998; Matsumoto, 2002) could be applied to
the behavior of fund managers. The structure of the market character-
ized by remuneration based on short-term performance drives myopia
in fund managers.
Quarterly company reporting, which places a focus on the ﬁnancial
performance of the company’s share price in the immediate future is
another factor which only serves to exacerbate the problem according
to interviewees. As a senior member responsible for the ethical invest-
ment strategy of an asset management company argues:
The most diﬃcult part of it is quarterly reporting. The absolute
focus on trying to deliver returns on a quarterly by quarterly
basis and having that perception that a client would leave you
because you’ve dragged below the line on that level is ridicu-
lous and that’s what is stopping eﬀective stewardship to create
long-term investment (Fieldwork Interview, asset manager,
2013).
The structure of the market is also believed to not be functioning prop-
erly due to the fact that price signals are much clearer in the short term
—the ﬁnancial impact of issues such as climate change is not reﬂected
in ﬁnancial calculations.
5.2 | Company transparency and investor experience
in activism
The second most commonly cited challenge to investor activism relates
to two issues—on the one hand, the lack of suﬃcient information on
companies’ social and environmental activities and, on the other hand,
the lack of investor experience in terms of how to eﬀectively engage
with companies. Surveys of the ethical investment scene conducted by
researchers identify information as the key to eﬀective action (see
Domini & Kinder, 1984; Ward, 1986). Yet, interviewed investors
reported that their time and resources were scarce, limiting their ability
to focus on ESG issues and to ascertain with clarity the problems with
targeted companies on the ground. This observation was also reaf-
ﬁrmed by the responsible investments specialists and NGO members
interviewed:
Asset managers and asset owners tend to be relatively under-
informed and dependent on narrow streams of information
from industry analysts, rating agencies and other companies
(Fieldwork Interview, NGO, 2013).
In addition, respondents identiﬁed that the main challenge stems from
quantifying the ﬁnancial impact that ESG factors are having on a
portfolio:
The challenges are to identify what potential measurable
impacts on the bottom line do ESG issues have and that’s often
diﬃcult to do (Fieldwork Interview, research and engagement
services provider, 2013).
The ﬁnancial impacts resulting from sustainability, for example
brand equity beneﬁts, are very hard to measure. It is hard to
link a positive approach to a wide range of sustainability issues
with better returns for investors (Fieldwork Interview, asset
manager, 2013).
In such a context, investors’ reliance on company information becomes
crucial. However, the current study suggests that company transpar-
ency is identiﬁed by interviewees as lacking suﬃcient detail. The need
for more adequate information disclosure in annual reports is reﬂected
in the words of one respondent working in the sustainability depart-
ment of a major fund management ﬁrm:
It is sometimes not easy to understand to what extent a com-
pany is exposed to an issue, so better disclosure from compa-
nies might be useful (Fieldwork Interview, asset manager, 2013).
These results are substantiated by the previous literature. Harte, Lewis,
and Owen (1991) assess the usefulness of the annual report for provid-
ing information on investment decisions and conclude that respond-
ents share a strong degree of consensus about the insuﬃciency of
information provided for appraising a company’s performance in the
area of CSR. In a similar vein, Perks, Rawlinson, and Ingram (1992, p.
62) argue that most annual reports “contain little to indicate companies’
environmental activities” and Revelli and Viviani (2015) comment on
the much less stringent reporting for social and ethical aspects com-
pared with economic aspects.
Apart from suﬃcient information on company activities and the
impact of ESG on ﬁnancial returns, the ﬁndings reveal that activist
investors often lack knowledge on how to conduct a successful
engagement. As Becht et al. (2010) suggest, in the UK context, most
investors tend to engage privately with companies via dialogue. How-
ever, there are few alternatives in cases when this engagement route
proves ineﬀective:
Investors do talk to the companies but, if nothing improves,
they keep their investment and there are no implications. This
makes management question the saliency and the urgency of
this engagement (Fieldwork Interview, academic expert in RI,
2013).
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Public activism in the form of AGM attendance and ﬁling of share-
holder resolutions is one avenue for escalating an engagement. It is
much more frequently used in the United States compared to the UK
due to a regulatory system which facilitates access to corporate proxy
statements (Louche & Lydenberg, 2006) and to cultural diﬀerences
between UK and transatlantic investors (Ivanova, 2016). This failure to
go beyond private dialogue could be explained by a lack of experience
in other forms of shareholder activism:
To go to an AGM to ask a question you got to know what you
do, how you do that, if you are going to table a resolution at an
AGM, knowing how to present a resolution (Fieldwork Interview,
asset owner, 2013).
More broadly, evidence of lack of investor experience in responsible
investment is also found in a study by Sievanen (2014), who discovers
that key decision makers face diﬃculties in deﬁning RI in practice and
implementing it at the individual and organizational levels.
5.3 | Internal conﬂicts of interest
The results show that conﬂicts of interest are also considered as a bar-
rier to stewardship. Consistent with previous literature discussed above
(McCahery et al., 2016), it was discovered that investors are sometimes
reluctant to engage because they feel this could have a negative impact
on their future ability to communicate with management and their rela-
tionship with the targeted company:
Investors in the UK are very concerned about upsetting the
company and having the good dialogue channel closed (Field-
work Interview, NGO, 2013).
Institutional shareholders need to be able to say they had X
number of meetings with X number of people in the company,
and they feel they won’t get into those meetings, if they
challenge the companies too robustly (Fieldwork Interview,
RI consultant, 2013)
Similar to the ﬁndings of Brickley, Lease, and Smith (1988) and Cvija-
novic, Dasgupta, and Zachariadis (2016) a small number of interview-
ees expressed the view that fund managers may refrain from
contradicting management because of existing business ties and inter-
locked interests with the company:
Many fund managers are not very diﬀerent from the compa-
nies they invest in, they are very big companies, they have in
many ways the same interests, and they probably have senior
executives who are on the board of other companies, which
makes engagement diﬃcult (Fieldwork Interview, NGO, 2013).
However, what was interesting to note was that the greatest emphasis
was on internal conﬂicts of interest within institutional investors them-
selves and on conﬂicts of interest between investors who engage col-
laboratively on a topic. On the ﬁrst point, interviewees suggested that
often times the socially responsible investment department of an insti-
tution expresses interest in engaging on a speciﬁc topic, but this is met
with disagreement from the equities department, or a lack of support
from senior management:
Sometimes in a ﬁnancial institution the CSR department is sep-
arated from the equity team, so the equity team do their
investment, the CSR team do their engagement, but there is no
connection between the two (Fieldwork Interview, academic
expert in RI, 2013).
There are internal issues within institutional shareholders that
are challenges to actual eﬀective shareholder activism. Maybe
the SRI team really want to do something, but the traditional
equity team won’t let them and that’s a completely internal
thing (Fieldwork Interview, RI consultant, 2013).
As shareholders generally have diversiﬁed portfolios and hold small
stakes in any given company, cooperation between them is key to
inﬂuencing corporate strategy (Marinetto, 1998). However, conﬂicts of
interest also arise during collaborative engagements between investors
due to the existence of what Scott (1985, p. 51) terms a “constellation
of interests.” The empirical data suggests that the divergent interests
of investors and their diﬀerent time horizons (transient versus dedi-
cated investors as labeled by Bushee, 1998) undermine the impact of
their campaign:
Collaboration by multiple investors is more persuasive to com-
panies, but not always that easy to achieve because in engage-
ment activities each participant has its own agenda and views
(Fieldwork Interview, ESG senior investment analyst, 2013).
5.4 | Diversiﬁed portfolios and resource scarcity
Diﬀuse ownership—a central characteristic of the Anglo-American
model of corporate governance—is another challenge to eﬀectively
monitoring the corporation according to interviewees. Useem (1993)
draws on the idea of resource dependency as a critical lever of power
to explain that the power of company B over company A is a result of
the reliance of A on the resources of B. Therefore, when ownership is
dispersed, there are so many shareholders that the corporation is
dependent on no one in particular.
Large publicly traded corporations, each owned by many share-
holders, came into being at the end of the 19th and the beginning of
the 20th century as a result of the absorption of a considerable number
of small and medium-sized companies (Bakan, 2005). Bakan (2005)
argues that, in these large corporations, the thousands, or even hun-
dreds of thousands of shareholders, have little inﬂuence over manage-
rial decisions. As individuals, their power is diluted and their broad
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dispersion also precludes them from acting collectively. The latter
statement is substantiated by the empirical ﬁndings of the study:
The main issue is that the ownership is very dispersed. We nor-
mally only own a small fraction of the company, so it’s the vari-
ety of shareholders that companies have and the diﬀerent
levels of interest in exercising stewardship (Fieldwork Interview,
asset owner, 2013).
Having a diversiﬁed portfolio of shares dilutes the inﬂuence of invest-
ors, making it more diﬃcult for them to organize and collaborate eﬀec-
tively. Another factor which diminishes their inﬂuence vis-a-vis
management is the lack of suﬃcient resources (both people and time)
that would otherwise facilitate an investor campaign:
Resources, that’s the single biggest challenge. If you invest, like
we do, in hundreds and hundreds of companies, to research
them properly, to understand the issues that they face, and to
engage with them eﬀectively over a period of time, is very
resource intensive (Fieldwork Interview, asset manager, 2013).
These results are consistent with previous literature. Wen (2009) cites
the diﬀused ownership structure characteristic of the Anglo-American
model of corporate governance as a deﬁning factor in the passivity of
institutional investors and their preference for exit (selling of shares)
over voice (monitoring). A survey of 143 large institutional investors
across countries conducted by McCahery et al. (2016) also reveals that
respondents identify lack of resources, small stakes in companies, and
diversiﬁed portfolios across many companies as barriers to monitoring
management.
5.5 | Client inertia
The ﬁfth and ﬁnal challenge to active ownership is the lack of client
demand for engagement on ESG issues. This refers to insuﬃcient over-
sight of fund managers by their clients—asset owners such as pension
funds, charities, foundations, insurance and sovereign wealth funds,
and retail investors, which do not incorporate sustainability considera-
tions in fund managers’ mandates and do not encourage them to
engage with investee companies with a view to improving their social
and environmental practices:
A lot of the people we talk to in the asset management world
say “Look, we really want to do this, but we get so little
demand from clients. We just don’t get pension funds asking
us about social and environmental issues” (Fieldwork Interview,
NGO working closely with investors, 2013).
Fund managers are paid to do a job and, if they are not incen-
tivized, and in fact are actively disincentivized, from being
active owners of companies, then they are not going to do it
(Fieldwork Interview, RI consultant, 2013).
Change has to come from client demand and wider societal
expectations (Fieldwork Interview, asset owner, 2013).
Although not limited to one type of asset owner, such inertia is particu-
larly problematic for pension funds, given their large shareholdings and
their ﬁduciary duty, or legal obligation to act in the best interests of
pension savers. Pension funds in the UK are among the largest asset-
owning types of investors (Maslakovic, 2011) and the UK is the second
largest market after the United States with about 10% of the world’s
total pension assets. Hess (2007) expresses optimism about the ability
of public pension funds to act as a powerful catalyst for change in the
social and environmental practices of companies, and believes they can
serve as surrogate regulators. In similarity to these arguments, as early
as the 1970s, Drucker (1976) also acknowledged the importance of the
growth of private pension provision and of pension funds who have
become the controlling owners of America’s largest companies. Yet,
despite their potential for bringing about change, the current empirical
ﬁndings, as well as previous research (Hess, 2007), suggest that, in their
majority, pension funds, alongside other types of asset owners, are cur-
rently not acting as long-term stewards.
This lack of oversight on the part of pension funds could be
explained by looking further down the investment chain to their clients
—the pension savers. British sociologist Robin Blackburn’s (2002) main
argument is that employees (pension savers) should exercise demo-
cratic control over corporations and should ensure that their practices
beneﬁt them, their families, and the communities they live in rather
than the ﬁnancial services industry. The ﬁndings of this study suggest
that there is demand from within the investment management industry
for pension savers to become more involved and express their views
on how their money is managed. Furthermore, their involvement is
seen as a factor that could drive a change toward greater active owner-
ship by asset owners:
Change in the behaviour of investors towards greater engage-
ment is possible if more pension scheme beneﬁciaries were ask-
ing about these issues (Fieldwork Interview, fund manager, 2013).
I would love there to be an opportunity for the beneﬁciaries to
express pleasure or concern at the execution by the individual
fund managers of the Stewardship Code (Fieldwork Interview,
fund manager, 2013).
Clark and Hebb (2004) criticize Drucker’s argument on the basis that
he fails to outline the mechanisms by which such dispersed ownership
can be uniﬁed to undertake concerted action. According to Clark and
Hebb (2004), although the role of pension savers is widely discussed,
they are unable to sustain their position as central actors. Instead, they
envision a world where pension funds act as single industry players
who take decisions on behalf of pension savers but are not controlled
by them. Previous studies have suggested that NGOs can serve as the
mechanism that uniﬁes pension savers to undertake concerted action
and to regain center stage and show evidence that pension savers can
be mobilized around a particular issue (Richardson, 2007). However,
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important as savers might be, the empirical ﬁndings suggest that the
movement that empowers people to know where their pension savings
are invested and to push for change is still in its nascent state and, as
argued by a sustainability research expert at a mainstream fund
manager:
At the moment, a relatively tiny proportion of pension savers
ask any questions at all about these issues and some pension
funds use that as an excuse to do nothing. So the more pension
savers ask, the better (Fieldwork Interview, fund manager,
2013).
6 | Implications and conclusion
The current study, based on a total of 25 qualitative interviews, has
systematically discussed the challenges to investor stewardship in the
UK context. The literature on the subject suggests that institutional
investors’ ability to monitor the corporation is hindered by a number of
diﬀerent factors. The free rider problem occupies a central place in the
discussion. Shleifer and Vishny (1986) argue that large shareholders
have an incentive to monitor because the return on their shares is big
enough to cover the monitoring costs. However, other smaller share-
holders also beneﬁt from gains on their shares. According to Grossman
and Hart (1980), minority shareholders wishing to free ride on the
improvements generated by a corporate raider diminish the potential
proﬁt the activist investor can generate. This leads to failed takeover
bids and a situation where bad management is not penalized. Research
predicts that the larger stake size of shareholders (Agrawal & Man-
delker, 1992), as well as a larger number of blockholders (Edmans &
Manso, 2011; Noe, 2002), reduce the free rider problem. It is interest-
ing to note that, although featuring prominently in the literature, only a
very small number of interviewees in the study identiﬁed the free rider
problem as a challenge to engagement.
Investor activism may also be hindered by fears of breaching legal
rules. In an eﬀort to explain the drivers of shareholder passivity in the
United States, David and Thompson (1994) cite diversiﬁcation require-
ments that prohibit banks and mutual funds from owning control blocks
that would otherwise increase their inﬂuence (Roe, 1991), as well as
rules that make collaborative action between investors diﬃcult (i.e., rule
13D in the United States or the risk of making a public oﬀer in Europe).
In addition, conﬂicts of interest can serve as a deterrent to invest-
ors who want to engage with management. Brickley et al. (1988) pro-
vide evidence that certain types of investors such as insurance
companies, banks, and trusts are less likely to oppose management
when voting on antitakeover amendments because of existing business
relations they have with the ﬁrms. Similarly, Cvijanovic et al. (2016)
ﬁnd that business ties with portfolio ﬁrms lead to pro-management
voting by mutual funds. A survey of 142 large institutional investors by
McCahery et al. (2016) conﬁrms that conﬂicts of interest are of impor-
tance as the results reveal that investors believe monitoring leads to
problems with receiving information from targeted ﬁrms. From a theo-
retical perspective, Juravle and Lewis’s (2008) framework also cites
conﬂicts of interest as an institutional impediment to engagement.
Nevertheless, the framework does not draw a distinction between
internal and external conﬂicts, nor does it reﬂect on the relevant impor-
tance of one versus the other. Similarly, previous research cited above
(Brickley et al., 1988; McCahery et al., 2016) remains silent on the sub-
ject of internal conﬂicts of interest and instead emphasizes external
conﬂicts between institutional investors and companies. However, the
ﬁndings of this study place an emphasis on the importance of internal
conﬂicts of interest within institutional investors themselves as an
inhibiting factor which prevents eﬀective monitoring. It was discovered
that diﬀerent departments within institutions often have diﬀering
views on whether the organization should engage or not.
The structure of the investment management industry and the cor-
porate governance framework within which investors operate can also
be impediments to shareholder activism. For example, fund managers
may not engage due to a lack of encouragement by asset owners who
do not reward activism (McCahery et al., 2016). In the context of the
Anglo-American corporate governance model, the deeply rooted idea
of shareholder value, the highly diversiﬁed ownership structure and
liquid markets, are all factors that minimize the incentives for monitor-
ing (Wen, 2009). The results provide empirical evidence which validates
existing inferences made in the literature about the misalignment of
interests within the investment management industry (McCahery et al.,
2016) and the dispersed ownership structure of the Anglo-American
corporate governance system. It is interesting to note that the most
commonly cited challenge in this paper bears no relation with the indi-
vidual preferences of investors and instead has to do with the structure
of the investment management industry which results in misalignment
of interests. This conclusion also has implications for policy makers as
it reveals that the barriers are great in scale and would be facilitated at
least in part by regulation.
The ﬁndings are largely consistent with previous theoretical and
empirical studies which cite free rider problems, conﬂicts of interest,
lack of information and diﬀused ownership as barriers (Coﬀee, 1991;
Cvijanovic et al., 2016; Duan, Hotchkiss, & Jiao, 2016; Grossman &
Hart, 1980; Harte et al., 1991). However, the study contributes to the
existing literature by shedding light on barriers which have so far been
unexplored, for example, the existence of client inertia in terms of
engagement on ESG issues, internal conﬂicts of interest, and lack of
investor experience in activism. Juravle and Lewis’s (2008) theoretical
framework could thus be extended by adding the “client inertia” vari-
able to the “institutional impediments” level, as well as “insuﬃcient
experience” to the “organizational impediments” level. In addition, the
paper has discovered that shareholder activism is also inhibited by
inconclusive evidence regarding the link between sustainability and
ﬁnancial performance and the impact of ESG factors on investment
portfolios. Indeed, the empirical literature to date has provided mixed
results with regard to the link between shareholder activism and corpo-
rate ﬁnancial performance, with scholars reporting positive (Cunat
et al., 2012; Klein & Zur, 2009), negative (Cai & Walkling, 2011; Karp-
oﬀ, Malatesta, & Walkling, 1996), and insigniﬁcant market reactions to
activism (Agrawal, 2012; Revelli & Viviani, 2015). According to Revelli
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and Viviani (2015) such divergent results are due to the heterogeneity
of SRI deﬁnitions and the methodologies used to measure its eﬀects.
Although the lack of consensus on the topic is universally accepted,
the current paper provides evidence of the eﬀects of this lack of con-
sensus on investor behavior. The paper has contributed to the monitor-
ing versus short-termism debate in the literature by going beyond
traditional explorations of the characteristics of active investors and
the link between stewardship and ﬁnancial performance. Instead, the
study has explored an alternative research question which considers
the structural conditions and macro environmental factors that hinder
active investors’ monitoring activities. The research also contributes to
the work of Juravle and Lewis (2008) by providing a more detailed
view of how organizational and institutional factors can serve as
impediments to investor activism.
In view of the importance of identifying the impact of ESG factors
on ﬁnancial performance, and given the conﬂicting views in the litera-
ture, future research could work toward establishing a greater degree
of consensus on the topic. This would require better operationalization
and consistent use of concepts across studies, as well as more studies
quantifying the impact of monitoring on returns. The current paper has
shed light into the challenges faced by institutional investors in the UK,
but future research could explore the barriers in diﬀerent geographical
contexts. In addition, research could analyze the root causes of client
inertia and study pension savers’ general awareness and willingness to
adopt a more involved role in their investments. Given the fact that the
misalignment of interests was identiﬁed as the most signiﬁcant barrier
by interviewees, future enquiry could focus on advancing ways of
reforming the structure of the investment management industry by
proposing alternatives to existing institutional logics.
ACKNOWLEDGMENT
This work was supported by the Economic and Social Research
Council [grant number ES/J500197/1].
CONFLICT OF INTEREST
Author Mila Ivanova declares that she has no conﬂict of interest.
NOTE
1 Cowton (1994, p. 215) deﬁnes SRI as “the exercise of ethical and social
criteria in the selection and management of investment portfolios.” In this
study, the term responsible investment is shortened from socially respon-
sible investment (SRI). Responsible investment is an umbrella term that
encompasses a variety of investor strategies—both passive investing (neg-
ative and positive screening) and active investing (shareholder activism or
monitoring) (see the 2014 European Sustainable Investment Forum’s SRI
survey which outlines these strategies in detail).
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